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DRAWING AGAINST UNCOLLECTED CHECKS: I
UNDERHILL MOORE, GILBERT SUSSMAN AND
EMMA CORSTVETt
A RECORD disclosed that a checking account customer of an insolvent
commercial bank, whose assets were in the hands of a receiver for
distribution, endorsed a third person's check and delivered it with a
deposit slip to the bank which entered the amount of the check as a
credit, both in his passbook and in the individual ledger in which the
bank recorded his deposits, or in one of them, before the closing of the
bank. On the deposit slip or in the passbook which was delivered to the
bank there was printed a clause or clauses which purported to stipulate
part of the consequences to follow the delivery of the check.' The assets
of the bank were sequestered, and a receiver was appointed before the
check was collected. Thereafter the check was collected and the assets
in the hands of the receiver were increased by the amount of the check.
Upon this record, a group of New York City judges in March and April,
1931,2 allowed the customer a preferred claim for the amount of the
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1. The stipulation clause upon the deposit slip read: "All items credited sALl be sub-
ject to actual receipt or final payment by this Bank, which shall not be held responsible
for its delay or failure to present, collect or protest any item." The stipulation in the
passbook read: "Deposits of all items are accepted for entry only and are subject to final
payment at the point on which drawn. All credits other than those for money shall be
subject to cancellation if not paid upon presentation. In receiving and forwarding chechs,
drafts and other items, this bank acts only as your agent and will make its best effort
to select responsible agents, but shall not be liable for losses sustained by the faflure ,
default or neglect of such agents, or for losses in the course of transmission, or due to
cause or causes beyond this bank's control. "
2. Matter of Vavoudis, 141 Misc. 823, 252 N. Y. Supp. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd
without opinion, 233 App. Div. 672, 249 N. Y. Supp. 370, 233 App. Div. 814, 250 N. Y.
Supp. 797 (1st Dep't, 1931). See Altmark v. Bank of United States, 233 App. Div. 8S4,
251 N. Y. Supp. 816 (1931).
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check. Upon another record which differed from the one just stated
cnly in the form of the stipulation3 a group of Central Ohio judges in
April, 1931, disallowed a preferred claim.'
These cases and the probability of the rendering in the near future of
other decisions in other regions upon similar records suggested the pos-
sibility of making a test of the "institutional" hypothesis' like that re-
ported in Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting
of Direct Discounts' and in Legal and Institutional Methods Applied
to Orders to Stop Payment of Checks.7 A tentative decision was made
to test the hypothesis by the Vavoudis and the Smith & Setron Printing
Co. cases."
But at once it was foreseen that the gathering in New York City and
in Ohio of the data necessary for such a study would require long
absences from home and very laborious work outside of the office. In
order to provide themselves with an excuse for postponing for as long a
time as possible this inconvenient and arduous task, the writers agreed
that before beginning it they would undertake a more convenient and
easier piece of work. Why not, on the basis of what they already knew
and could readily learn without leaving the office, write something about
the Vavoudis and the Smith & Setron Printing Co. cases?
It was agreed that the article should, of course, be an attempt to find
the answer to the conventional question or questions, whether the New
York case and the Ohio case would be affirmed or reversed by the Court
of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court, whether the courts of other
jurisdictions would, upon either of these records, allow the customer a
preferred claim or a dividend upon the amount of the check.
It was agreed, however, not to attempt to answer the question by as-
suming Aristotelian logic and the relations stated in propositions of law
3. Here the stipulation read: "Checks on this bank will be credited conditionally. If
not found good at close of business, they may be charged back to depositors and the
latter notified of the fact. Checks on other city banks may be carried over for presenta.
tion through the clearing house on the following day. In receiving items on deposit
payable elsewhere than in Cleveland this bank assumes no responsibility for the failure
of any of its direct or indirect collecting agents, and shall only be held liable when
proceeds in actual funds or solvent credits shall have come into its possession. Under
these conditions items previously credited may be charged back to the depositor's account.
Items lost in transit may be charged back to depositor's account pending receipt of dupli-
cates. Unless otherwise instructed, items may be mailed to drawee banks. Unpaid Items
may be returned by mail at depositor's risk. In making deposits the depositor hereby
assents to the foregoing conditions."
4. Smith & Setron Printing Co. v. State of Ohio, 40 Ohio App. 32, 178 N. E. 211 (1931).
5. See Moore and Hope, An Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial BankhIg
(1929) 38 Yale L. J. 703.
6. Moore and Sussman (1931), 40 YM L. J. 381, 555, 752, 928, 1055, 1219.
7. Moore, Sussman and Brand (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 817, 1198.
8. A second article will report a study made preliminary to an attempt to test the
hypothesis.
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to obtain between facts and decisions to be self-evidently true and some-
how revealed or discovered in speculation. Nor was the attempt to be
to find the answer by assuming that propositions of law are hypotheses
which have in fact been verified and that Aristotelian logic is a tool and,
for the present purpose, a sufficient tool for the manipulation of proposi-
tions of law. In short, it was agreed not to attempt to answer the ques-
tion by the application of either of the "legal methods" of the analytical
jurist.' Moreover, it was agreed not to attempt to answer the question
by making a lawyer's professional forecast of the probable decision by
an intuition of experience-an intuitive judgment, a rational, but not
logical, calculus-which strives to take into account every factor in the
situation impinging on the deciding judges, whether it is a factor as-
sociated significantly in the consciousness of the judges with the decision
or whether it is a factor below the level of their consciousness, but judged
by the lawyer to be significantly associated with the impending judg-
ment of the court." Finally it was agreed not to answer the question by
making an objective study of beliefs held or ideas accepted as true by
judges, following one of the methods of the social psychologists in their
studies of attitudes or of the symbols supposed to be associated with
them."
Rather, it was agreed to attempt to answer the question in the manner
of the introspective jurist who accounts for and anticipates judicial de-
cisions wholly or partially on the basis of beliefs held or ideas accepted
as true by judges, and who ascertains their beliefs or ideas by exploring
the consciousness of the judges by uncontrolled observation of his own
consciousness.12 Accordingly, in this article, the writers will attempt to
answer the question of dividend or preference first by determining by a
9. Two of the writers have already attempted to answer a similar question by the
application of the analytical jurist's 'legal method." Moore, Sussman and Brand, Legal
and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to Stop Payment of Checks (1933) 42 YAI.
L. J. 817.
10. The application of this method has already been attempted by two of the writers.
Moore and Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct
Discounts (1931) 40 Yale L. J. 381.
11. See for example Robinson, Trends of the Voters Mind (1933) 4 Joum.AL or SocL%,s
PSYcHOLOGY 265-284.
12. CRDOZO, THE NATURE or THE JUDICaAL PRocEss (1921) 31, 54; Tn. Gnowrn or
TnE LAw (1924) 22, 32; PoUND, THE SPI or TiE Co o L.tw (1921) 33, 118;
AN T 'nODuci oy To Tim PnosoPm: OF Liw (1922) 90; ITN-rPRETATi0x:S or LeaCuL
HISsTORy (1923) 22, 64, 92; JuRsPRpunm c, REsxAxacH n; SOCiaL SCmnCES (edited by
Wilson Gee, 1929) 181; Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism (1931) 44 H]nv. L. Re,.
1222, 1244, 1245; Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law? (1905) 5 CoT. L. Re,. 339,
345; id., Mechanical Jurisprudence (1908) 8 CoL. L. Rv. 609; id., Scope and Purpose of
Sociological Jurisprudence (1911) 24 HAEv. L. REv. 593 et seq. (1911) 25 Hm%,S. L. PM,.
140; id., The Theory of Judicial Decision (1923) 36 HAnv. L. REv. 642, 952. See alo
AaPoLD, SYrnooLs or Go%r_,arrvi (1935); RoBnzsoN, L;,W AzD T= LAv'E:rs (1935)
'especially chapter VIII et seq.).
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process of uncontrolled introspection of the writers' own consciousness,
what beliefs will be held by the judges after argument, and secondly by
determining by intuition the probable significance of the association, in
the consciousness of the judges, of all or some of these beliefs with the
decision granting or denying the customer a preferred claim for the
amount of the check. The result of this attempt to determine the beliefs
which the introspective jurist attributes to judges is reported below under
four headings: (1) beliefs as to banking practice; (2) economic beliefs;
(3) legal beliefs; (4) ethical or moral beliefs.
1. Beliefs as to how checks deposited with a bank are collected and as
to when they are drawn against
In the stream of consciousness of the introspective jurist's judge, his
beliefs as to the deposit and collection of a third person's check drawn
on another bank appear to be as follows:18 The deposit of the check is
made by a customer with a checking account either by handing it to an
employee or by mailing it to the bank. A deposit slip, which may or
may not contain stipulations purporting to state some of the con-
sequences of the deposit, is filled in by the customer and accompanies
the delivery of the check or is filled in by an employee of the bank. At
intervals during the day the deposit slips are sent to the bookkeepers who
enter the amounts received as credits in the bank's record of the custo-
mers' checking accounts. The checks, which are separated by the
tellers or other employees receiving them into local and out-of-town
checks, are, if local, sent to the department charged with presenting them
or, if out-of-town, sent to the department responsible for the collection
of transit items. At the end of the same day or the beginning of the
next, debit entries reflecting the amount of the checks deposited are made
in the accounts in the general ledgers of the bank which disclose the
total of the bank's deposit liabilities.
On the following morning local checks are presented through the clear.
ing house or directly to the banks on which they are drawn and are, as
soon as may be, debited to the accounts of their drawers. The clearing
balances between the several banks are determined and settlements made
by the banks in debit within a few hours of the delivery of the check.
Settlements are made either by means of debits and credits on the ac-
counts of the several banks with a Federal Reserve or some other bank;
or are made by drafts drawn dn out-of-town banks. If the settlement
13. Possibly the judge acquired his beliefs as did the following authors, or as a result
of reading their books: Kxrmm, THE PCncAL VORK OF A BANiX (1921); Co m. cLAx
BAN=XG (1923); LAxGSTON, PRAcricAL BAN OPERATxON (1921); SPAxm, Thn CLEAIILNO
.Nu CoLmEcTioN o CHEcxs (1926); WzsTERrm., BA NM P cn'LFS AND pRAcrs
(1928). See description of the process of collection in the next and final article.
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is by draft, the bank receiving it proceeds to effect its collection in the
same manner as any other check on the same drawee. A local check
which is dishonored is returned to the presenting bank by the afternoon
of the day it is presented or before banking hours the next morning and
its amount is credited upon the current day's clearing balance. As soon
as may be after a dishonored check is returned to the depositary, it is
debited to the account of the depositor. Thus a day or two days elapse
between the deposit of a local check and the time when the bank pre-
senting it receives credit or a draft for its amount and, in the event that
the check is dishonored, the same period of a day or two elapses before
the time when the check is returned. Obviously, if the settlement is by
draft, additional time will elapse before the draft is, in its turn, settled
for by its drawee. "Proceeds" of the check, if it be honored, "are
received" by the depositary when it is clear to the depositary from the
time which has elapsed that it will not be returned dishonored; or per-
haps the "proceeds are received" when there has happened some one of
the events in the process of deposits, credit entries, debit entries and
settlements through which the check and the draft, if one is given in
settlement, progress in their journey back to the drawer. The average
time required for a check to be returned dishonored and for the happening
of some or all of the events in the process called its collection--one or
two days-are factors in determining the time stated in the availability
schedule 4 for local checks as the time at which the credit represented
by the credit entry becomes "available" or "immediate credit." If the
depositary is permitted to pay interest to its customers on its demand
deposits and does pay interest, it will, at a time which may be before or
after the expiration of the time specified in the availability schedule,
include the amount of the check in the interest balance.
Checks which are not local are generally sent, together with a cash
letter, to one or more out-of-town correspondents with whom the de-
positary maintains a current account. The vast majority of checks will
rarely be received by the correspondent to which they are sent later
than twenty-four hours after they are mailed. On the day of their
receipt, entries for the amounts of the checks received are, as in the
case of the deposits of customers who are not bankers, made on the
credit side of the correspondent bank's record of the depositary's account.
Again, as in the case of checks deposited in the depositary bank, they are
separated into local checks, i.e., checks drawn on banks in the corres-
pondent's city, and out-of-town checks, i.e., those drawn on other places.
Local items are handled in the same manner in which the depositary
bank handled local checks received by it: they are presented, debited to
the drawer's account and settled for, either by debiting and crediting or
14. For description of availability schedules and some explanation of their functions
see infra pp. 29, 30, 31.
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by draft. If the settlement is by draft, the bank receiving it proceeds
to effect its collection in the same inanner as a check on the same drawee.
A local check in the hands of a correspondent which is dishonored by
the drawee is returned to the correspondent on the day of its present-
ment and is debited to the depositary's account with the correspondent
on the same or the following day. For example, if the depositary bank
is in a New England city and the correspondent in Boston or New York,
the making of the debit entry by the correspondent will rarely be later
than the first day after thd day of the original deposit of the check. On
the same day that a local check is returned to the correspondent and
debited, the check with a notice of the debit is mailed to the depositary.
The check and notice are rarely received by the depositary later than
twenty-four hours after their mailing, in other words, the second day
after the day of the original deposit. The depositary, on the day of
receipt of the returned check, debits the account of the depositor and
mails him a notice of the debit. "Proceeds" of the check, if it be honored,
."are received" by the depositary when it is clear to the depositary from
the time which has elapsed that it will not be returned dishonored; or
perhaps "proceeds are received" when there has happened some one of
the events in the process of deposits, credit entries, debit entries and
settlements through which the check and the draft, if one is given in
settlement, progress in their journey back to the drawer. The average
time required for a check to be returned dishonored and for the happen-
ing of some or all of the events in the process called its collection are
factors in determining the time stated in the correspondent's availability
schedule 4 as the time at which the credit represented by its credit entry
for the local check becomes "immediate credit" or "available" to the
depositary. A schedule may make the amount of a local check available
on the day of its receipt by the correspondent or one day after its receipt;
thus the amount of a local check becomes available on the second or
third day after the receipt of the check by the depositary bank. If the
correspondent is permitted to pay interest on its demand deposits and
-does pay interest to the depositary it will, at a time which may be before
or after the expiration of the time specified in the availability schedule, in-
clude the amount of the check in the interest balance.
Out-of-town checks received from the depositary by the correspondent
are credited to the former's account within approximately twenty-four
hours after their original deposit. They are then sorted and despatched.
In most cases they are sent by the correspondent to those of its corres-
pondents, often Federal Reserve Banks, which are in the vicinity of the
various drawees; but they may be mailed directly to the drawees. Upon
their receipt by the second correspondents, the amounts of the checks are
entered as credits in the account of their customer, the first correspond-
ent. The receipt of the checks by the second correspondent and the
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entries for their amounts will generally be made not later than twenty-
four hours after the close of the day on which they were received by
the first correspondent; that is to say, they are usually received and
credited on the second day after the day of original deposit. Of course,
if the second correspondent is at some distance from the first, the time
required for receipt and credit may be several days longer.
The second correspondent handles the checks received in the same
manner as did the depositary or the first correspondent: on the day
received or on the following day it presents such of the checks as are
drawn on banks in the same city and either mails the out-of-town checks
directly to their drawees or forwards them to one or more of its own
correspondents with whom it maintains a current account. Perhaps the
second more frequently than the first correspondent presents checks
received by it either over the counter, through a clearing house or through
the mails, and less frequently than the first forwards checks to another
correspondent. Checks on drawees in the same city as the second corres-
pondent are presented and settled for by adjustment of balances or by
draft generally on the third or fourth day after the day of original
deposit. Checks mailed to their drawees are likely to be presented to
and debited by them on the fourth or fifth day after the day of original
deposit. Some of these are immediately settled for by adjustment of
balances; for the others, the drawees remit by draft, which is likely to
be received by the second correspondent on the fifth or sixth day after
the day of original deposit and is "collected" by the second correspondent
in the same manner as any like check deposited with it. Checks which
are dishonored are returned by the drawee to the second correspondent.
by the second to the first and by the first to the depositary, which on
the day it receives them debits them to the depositor's account. The
time elapsing between the original deposit and the receipt by the de-
positary of a returned check varies according to the location of depositary
and drawee; for example, a check deposited in a New England city and
drawn on a bank in New Mexico, if dishonored, would probably be re-
turned to the depositary twelve days after the day of deposit. If the
check is an out-of-town item as regards both the depositary and the first
correspondent, its "proceeds," if it be honored, "are received" by the
depositary when it is clear to the depositary from the time which has
elapsed that the check will not be returned dishonored; or perhaps the
"proceeds are received" when there has happened some one of the events
in the process of deposits, credit entries, debit entries and settlements
through which the check and the draft, if one is given in settlement,
progress in their journey back to the drawer. The average time required
for such a check to be returned dishonored and for the happening of
some or all of the events in the process called its collection are factors
in determining the time stated in the first correspondent's availability
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schedule as the time at which the credit represented by its credit entry
for the out-of-town check becomes "'immediate credit" or "available" to
the depositary.
The judge concludes his reflection: Following the original deposit of
a third person's check, is it possible to fix upon the particular event,
upon the particular point in the process of collection, to delimit the
period of time, after which the depositary has "received the proceeds"
of the check for the customer's account and before which the "proceeds"
have not yet been "received"? If that is possible, what is the particular
event, the particular point in the process of collection, the period of time
after, but not before which the "proceeds" have been "received"? For
example, are the "proceeds received" on the day of deposit, upon local
clearance by the depositary, on the day the check is credited to the de-
positary's account by the correspondent, on the day the drawee honors
it, on the day specified in the correspondent's availability schedule, on
the day the correspondent's claim against another bank has been in-
creased by the amount of the deposited check, on the day specified in the
depositary's availability schedule, or on the day the depositary's claim
against another bank has been increased by the amount of the deposited
check? In deciding whether the customer is entitled to a preference for
or a dividend on the amount of the deposited check, why is it of con-
sequence whether the particular event or the period .of time which marks
the "receipt of the proceeds" has happened or elapsed before the de-
positary closed insolvent, if demands of customers are regularly made
and honored before the happening of that event or the elapsing of that
time? Are demands of customers regularly made and honored before
the "proceeds are received"? If they are, does the regularity of the
practice restrict the customer to a dividend, although the "proceeds"
have not yet been "received"?
In the stream of consciousness of the introspective jurist's judge, after
what events does it appear that the demands of customers are made and
honored and before what events does it appear that they are not made
and honored? Surely, the judge reflects, most checks are not drawn
against on the day of their deposit. Surely, the common practice is to
maintain "collected" balances; surely, the majority of checks are not
,drawn against until a time much longer than that necessary for the
happening of all the events in the process of collection. It is true that
a minority of deposited checks are drawn against before the last of these
events has happened. But as to how large this minority is, and when
such drawing regularly occurs, whether upon the making of the credit
entry by the depositary or by the correspondent, upon the honoring by
the drawee, or upon some other event, and whether this event is the
same in New York City as in Central Ohio, the judge's reflection dis.
closes no belief.
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2. Beliefs as to the causal relation between the economic aspects of de-
positing, collecting and drawing against checks
In the stream of consciousness of the introspective jurist's judge, the
commercial banks of the country together constitute a banking system.
The system as a whole and each of its individual members perform func-
tions indispensable for the welfare of the country. By loans and dis.
counts they create purchasing power in the form of demand deposit
liabilities or checking account credit. This process of creation results
in making the volume of outstanding checking account credit peculiarly
susceptible to expansion and contraction according to business needs.
The loans and discounts are made for business men, the amount of
whose borrowings is related to their business needs. There are no
restrictions, except those imposed by the necessity of paying interest,
upon the amount of loans and discounts for which business men may
apply. In the granting of applications for loans and discounts, aside
from the limitations imposed by the low legal reserve required of com-
mercial banks and other relatively unimportant restrictions, such as
the amount which may be lent by one bank to one person, the amount
granted is limited only by the credit judgment of the bank. It is, of
course, true that bank notes are created upon the making of loans and
discounts for business men or upon the making of indirect loans to the
government by the purchase of its bonds; and, were the restrictions upon
their creation no more stringent than in the case of checking account
credit, there would be no difference between them in respect of ex-
pansion and contraction in conformity with the needs of business, as-
suming that the government followed business needs. But, in fact, the
restrictions are more stringent: bank notes, other than Federal Reserve
notes, may be issued only after the purchase by the bank and the deposit
with the government of government bonds of an equivalent value; and
the amount of Federal Reserve notes is controlled by a high gold reserve
of forty per cent. In the case of gold and silver coin or certificates there
is thought to be at most no more than a slight relation between the
amount of metallic coin or certificates and the needs of business. The
volume of gold and silver coin is thought to depend in large part upon
the accident of discovery. Greenbacks, it is true, are issued by the gov-
ernment and their amount is restricted only by the willingness of per-
sons to lend against this form of credit instrument. But it is clear
that there is not, as in the case of checking account credit, the certainty
of a direct relation between the amount of government notes issued and
the needs of business. Is there, however, such certainty of a direct
relation between the amount of checking account credit and the needs
of business? For instance, at the beginning of a depression, do loans
and discounts and checking account credit contract with automatic ease
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and certainty in proportion to the decrease in need for purchasing power?
If the needs of business are what control the volume of checking ac-
count credit, its volume is less subject to direct control by the govern-
ment than other forms of purchasing power. The issuance of national
bank notes depends upon the existence of government bonds with the
note issue privilege; the issuance of gold and silver coins and of gold
and silver certificates depends upon the purchase by the government of
gold and silver bullion; in the issue of government notes (greenbacks)
the initiative at least is always in the government itself. On the other
hand, in the case of checking account credit and Federal Reserve notes,
the government has no direct control over its amount; but its control,
if any, is indirect, as for example, through coercing the central bank
to change the rediscount rates or to pursue open market policies which
either increase or decrease the central bank's reserves. But the volume
of Federal Reserve notes is sooner and more easily affected by such
changes in the central bank's policies than is the volume of checking
account credit.
The checking account credit thus created by loans and discounts is
used in the liquidation of the vast majority of the transactions, both
wholesale and retail, which constitute the trade of the country. And it
is through the transfer of this form of purchasing power, by means of
the issuance, collection and clearing of checks, that another essential
function of the commercial banks is performed. The purchasing power
thus created and transferred by the banks has a higher velocity than
any other form of purchasing power in general use. A given number of
dollar units of purchasing power or medium of exchange in the form of
checking account credit will, within a given time, effect a greater number
of exchanges than will the same number of dollar units of any other
form of purchasing power or medium of exchange. Furthermore, this
form of purchasing power is more convenient than any other. By re-
quiring the least activity on the part of the users, it is least likely to im-
pinge on the whims or interfere with the activity of the users. It is
certainly more convenient than any medium for the payment of irregular
and large sums and as convenient as any for the payment of other
sums. The tokens by means of which it is transferred are less likely to
be stolen than are tokens representative of other forms of purchasing
power. On the other hand, this form of purchasing power is less con-
venient in that it is more easily forged or altered, it does not pass from
hand to hand with the same facility as bank notes or coins and it in-
volves a longer period of waiting before the completion of an exchange
undertaken.
In his reflection the judge then turns to a consideration of transactions
of deposit between commercial banks and their checking account custo-
mers. The business of a commercial bank is the borrowing and lending
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of money, the medium of exchange, or of purchasing power. The bank
borrows the medium of exchange or purchasing power from its customers
by receiving present deposits or by arranging with its customers for the
making of deposits in the future and lends to its customers either by
honoring or by standing ready to honor its customers' demands in excess
of the amount of the medium which it has received from them. When
a medium of exchange is received by a bank from its customer on ac-
count of his checking account, the transaction is one of present deposit
and the bank from and after the deposit stands ready to honor the custo-
mer's demands in an amount increased by the amount deposited. When
a bill of exchange or promissory note of a third person which is not a
medium of exchange, but rather a credit instrument calling for the pay-
ment of the medium, is received, the transaction is one of the future
deposit of the medium called for by the instrument. The deposit is com-
pleted when that medium is received by the depositary bank; and the
bank from and after, but not before, the deposit is completed, stands
ready to honor the customer's demands against the amount deposited.
In the case of either a present or a future deposit, the customer is a
depositor and creditor of the bank as soon as the bank stands ready to
honor. Upon insolvent liquidation of the bank's assets, he is entitled
to rank with other creditors who are depositors. Before a future deposit
becomes a present one, both bank and customer are interested in the
instrument and its proceeds, the bank because its assets will be increased
by the proceeds, the customer because the amount up to which the bank
stands ready to honor his demands will be increased by the amount of
the proceeds. But if the bank closes before a future deposit becomes a
present one, and the bank is therefore unable to receive the proceeds as
a deposit and to honor the customer's demands, the instrument, or its
proceeds if thereafter received, are returned to the customer.
However, before a future deposit becomes a present one, the bank
may, in fact, stand ready to honor the customer's checks in the same
way that it would stand ready had there been a present deposit. That
is to say, in the case of a future deposit, the bank may extend credit.
For example, credit may be extended for a period beginning with the
initiation of the deposit transaction by the delivery to the bank of a
credit instrument and ending either when the deposit is completed upon
the honoring of the instrument and the receipt of its proceeds by the
bank or when the instrument is dishonored. During the period of credit
extension, the bank stands ready to honor the customer's demands and
the customer is a depositor. If the bank closes before the period of
credit extension expires and the deposit becomes a present one, the
customer ranks with other creditors upon insolvent liquidation and the
instrument or its proceeds will not be returned to him. True, the future
deposit did not become a present one before the bank dosed; but the
YALE LAW JOURNAL
bank stood ready to honor the customer's demands before it closed, its
standing ready was purchasing power available to the customer, and that
purchasing power was precisely what the customer wanted. The situa-
tion is quite the same as if, instead of extending credit, the bank bad
paid the customer in cash the amount of the instrument with the under-
standing that the money should be returned if the deposit was not com-
pleted. Thus, whether the customer who has made a future deposit re-
ceives a preference or a dividend, depends upon whether the deposit had
been completed and had become a present one, or upon whether the
bank had extended credit pending the completion, before the depositary
bank closed insolvent. If the deposit had become a present one or if,
even though it had not, credit had been extended, the customer does not
receive a preference.
The judge is well aware that sometimes in the case of a future deposit
the deposited instrument is thought of as remaining the customer's and
the bank is thought of as his messenger, representative or agent to effect
its presentment unless the bank extends credit and stands ready to honor
from the time the deposited instrument is received. If the bank does
extend credit, the future deposit is thought of as a sale from the customer
to the bank of a credit instrument representing the obligation of the
drawer or maker for a purchase price which is the amount of the instru-
ment. The sale may be thought of either as subject to no conditions sub.
sequent or as subject to the conditions subsequent that, if the instrument
be dishonored and timely notice thereof be given to the seller, the sale is
rescinded and the purchase price, i.e., the amount of the instrument, is
to be repaid forthwith by an immediate debiting of the seller's account.
If the deposited instrument be received by a bank as messenger, repre-
sentative or agent, and if the bank closes insolvent before the proceeds
of the instrument have been received by the bank as its own, but for the
account of the customer, then, either the instrument is returned to the
customer or, if it has been collected by the receiver after the closing of
the bank, the customer is entitled to a preferred claim in the amount
of the proceeds. If, however, the deposit is a sale and the customer is
entitled to the price before the bank closes insolvent, then the customer
receives a dividend along with other creditors or depositors of the class
to which he belongs. Thus, in respect to the consequences of preference
or dividend it seems to the judge to make no difference whether a deposit
be thought of as a future deposit in which credit either has or has not
been extended or whether it be thought of as a transaction which is either
a purchase or an agency. Consequently, he finds it more convenient to
continue to think of the problem of preference or dividend in terms of
present and future deposits and credit extension.
But the judge recognizes that the problem actually presented does not
include the question of preference or dividend in a case in which either
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cash, a bill of exchange or a promissory note of a third person has been
received by the bank. The problem arises from a case in which the
bank has received from its customer a check drawn by a third person.
He asks himself whether a deposit of a check is a present deposit from
the moment the check is received by the bank or whether it is a future
deposit. If a future deposit, was credit extended before the bank closed?
Is the deposit of a check a present deposit so that from and after the
making of the deposit the bank stands ready to honor the customer's de-
mands in an amount increased by the amount deposited? A present de-
posit, it will be recalled, is one in which the bank receives a medium of
exchange. Certainly checks are commonly used to effect payment in
business transactions both retail and wholesale. Demand deposit liabili-
ties are used more frequently than any other form of purchasing power.
Indeed, checks are used just as "money" is used. When a payee
receives a check, he is receiving the common substitute for the medium
of exchange, and when his bank receives the check from him, it also is
receiving the common substitute for the medium of exchange. But is
this common substitute either a medium of exchange or substantially its
equivalent? A check is certainly a token representative of existing
purchasing power in the form of checking account credit. But it is not
a medium of exchange. A medium of exchange is purchasing power
which is generally acceptable to buyers and sellers and is, moreover, im-
mediately available for the final liquidation of accounts between buyers
and sellers. A check is not generally acceptable to buyers and sellers.
Some classes of sellers or creditors may accept from some classes of
drawers checks tendered in definitive or final payment or liquidation; but
certainly most sellers do not, under any circumstances, receive checks
from drawers except as tokens to be used to effect the transfer in the
future of a medium of exchange. Some classes of sellers or creditors may
accept from some classes of payees checks tendered in definitive or final
payment or liquidation, as they may accept those of drawers; but most
sellers or creditors do not under any circumstances receive checks from
payees except as tokens to be used to effect the transfer in the future of
a medium of exchange. Nor is a check immediately available to buyers
and sellers. In a society in which there were but one bank in whose
banking rooms and in the presence of whose bookkeeper all payments
were made by contemporaneous credit entries to the accounts of the
sellers and debit entries to the accounts of the buyers, demand liabilities
of the bank would be an immediate means of effecting final payment or
liquidation. But in a society like ours in which the use of demand
liabilities is made by drawing, delivering and depositing checks, some
time, usually a day or more, must elapse before the seller has secured
credit on the books of his bank. Therefore the demand liabilities of the
buyer's bank represented by his credit balance are not made immediately
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available to the seller and consequently are not immediately available to
the buyer as a means for closing forthwith that or any other transaction.
If the deposit of a check is not a present but a future deposit, there
remains the question of whether credit has been extended pending the
completion of the deposit and before the bank closed. Credit may not
have been extended at all. If it is extended, though the check has not
yet been presented and honored and the purchasing power which is its
proceeds not yet received by its depositary, when is it extended? Is
credit extended from the moment that the check is received by the bank
and the credit entry is made? When, upon the making of an arrange-
ment for a future deposit of its proceeds, a bill of exchange or promissory
note of a third person is delivered by a customer to his bank, there is
usually no difficulty in determining whether the bank has extended credit
from the receipt of the instrument until it is honored or dishonored. If
the bank receives a bill of exchange or promissory note which is (a)
not about to fall due, (b) through an officer whose function it is to extend
credit and after a credit investigation of the customer, (c) exacts com-
pensation, interest or discount, for the extension of credit during the
period expiring with the honoring or dishonoring of the instrument and
for the risk incidental to the extension, and (d) makes a credit entry for
the amount of the instrument less the discount, if any, in the record
of the customer's checking account, then credit is extended. If the
bank receives a bill of exchange or promissory note which is (a) mature
or about to mature, (b) through a teller whose functions do not include
the extension of credit and without a credit investigation of the customer
conducted more or less ad hoc, (c) exacts no compensation in the form
of interest or discount, and (d) makes no credit entry for the amount
of the instrument in the record of the customer's checking account, then
no credit has been extended.
When, however, the bank receives a third person's check which is (a)
payable on demand, drawn against funds already in the hands of the
drawee and which is expected to be presented and paid forthwith, (b)
through a teller, whose function is not the extension of credit and without
a credit investigation of the customer, (c) exacts no compensation in the
form of interest or discount, and (d) makes a credit entry for the amount
of the check in the record of the customer's checking account, is credit
extended?
If the future deposit of a check of a third person is in its essentials
like a transaction in which a bank receives from its customer a bill of
exchange or promissory note not about to mature, it may be that like
consequences are to be expected; it may be that in the case of the deposit,
as well as in the case of a bill of exchange or promissory note, credit is
extended and the bank stands ready to honor from the moment the
instrument is received. Or, if it is essentially like a transaction in which
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the bank receives a maturing bill or note, it may be that credit is not
extended and the bank does not stand ready to honor from the moment
the instrument is received. Whether it is significantly like either of
these deposits can only be determined by detailed comparison.
In respect of the shortness of the time elapsing before the instrument
is honored and the proceeds received by the depositary, the future deposit
of a check is similar to the future deposit of a maturing instrument and
dissimilar to the future deposit of a not-yet-maturing instrument. This
similarity points to a consequence upon the receipt of a check similar to
the consequence upon the receipt of a maturing instrument, i.e., no ex-
tension of credit. But this formal similarity certainly is not conclusive
of "no credit extension." It is not unfamiliar for a bank to stand ready
to honor its customer's demands before the receipt of the proceeds of a
sight draft delivered to it by the customer. Nor are loans for a few days
unfamiliar.
In that a check is received by a teller whose functions do not include
the making of loans and discounts, and in that there is no credit investi-
gation ad hoc, the future deposit of a check is similar to the future de-
posit of a maturing instrument and dissimilar to the future deposit of a
not-yet-maturing instrument. The similarity points to a consequence
upon the receipt of a check similar to the consequence upon the receipt
of a maturing instrument, i.e., no extension of credit. But the significance
of this formal similarity is also doubtful. It is true that bills and notes
are sometimes made payable at a bank and are honored out of the
drawer's account as if they were checks; but they are payable by one of
the innumerable individuals, firms or corporations engaged in business
throughout the country and against funds to be provided from the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the goods for the price of which the bill or note was
given. In the interval of time between the giving of the bill or note and
the maturity date, innumerable business exigencies may have affected the
drawer's financial status and his ability to provide funds for payment.
But a check is drawn upon a bank and against funds already provided.
In that no compensation is exacted by the bank upon the receipt of a
check for an extension of credit or for risk incidental to such an exten-
sion of credit, the check is like a maturing instrument and unlike a not-
yet-maturing instrument. The similarity points to a consequence upon
the future deposit of a check similar to that upon the future deposit of
a maturing instrument, i.e., no extension of credit. But this formal
similarity of a check to a collection item and dissimilarity to the discount
is not significant. All bills of exchange and promissory notes, whether
or not about to mature, are credit instruments which may be used at a
bank as devices for the creation of bank credit, that is, for an extension
of credit, and are not devices for the transfer of existing bank credit.
If, then, an instrument which is a device for the creation of bank credit.
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though it is about to mature, be received by a bank, the absence of an
interest charge, the usual concomitant of an extension of credit, may
well be significant of the fact that no credit has been extended. But a
check is not a device for the creation of bank credit, that is, for exten-
sion of credit. On the contrary, it is a device for the transfer of bank
credit which has already been created.. Thus a check is always drawn
against funds in the bank to which the check is addressed. If those
funds were the result of credit extended by that bank, then, from the
viewpoint of the country's banking system, compensation should be re-
garded as having already been paid for the bank credit which the check
is transferring. Hence, in determining whether credit is actually ex-
tended when a check is received by a bank under an arrangement for
future deposit of its proceeds, the absence of an interest charge is of no
weight.
However, the judge reflects further. Although a check is a device
for the transfer of bank credit, it is nevertheless true that the future
deposit of a check, in view of the fact that its proceeds may not be re-
ceived by the depositary bank for from eighteen hours to five or six
days, does offer an opportunity for an extension of credit in the amount
of the check during this period of time. If the bank stands ready to
honor the customer's checks up to an amount increased by the amount of
the check, credit is, in fact, extended, and, if no interest is charged, the
bank is, in fact, uncompensated for the extension and the risk. The
statement that a check is a device for the transfer of existing bank
credit is therefore a half truth. The truth is that a check is a device both
for the transfer of existing bank credit and for the creation of bank
credit. A bank may stand ready to honor its customer's demands during
the period between the receipt of a check and the receipt of its proceeds.
Hence, the absence of an interest charge in the case of the future deposit
of a check is a weighty factor in determining whether credit is extended.
But the statement that a check is a device for credit extension as well
as for transfer is misleading. If A draws a check on his bank and de-
livers it to its payee, B, the amount up to which A draws against his bank
is, in fact, reduced by the amount of the check delivered to B, though the
check has not yet been presented to and debited by A's bank. Hence, a
check is a device for the decrease of the total amount of bank credit of
the country during the period from its delivery until it is debited, unless
the bank in which B, the payee, made the future deposit, extends credit
against it; even then, it is a device for the decrease of the country's bank
credit during the period between its delivery to the payee and its receipt
by the payee's bank. From the viewpoint however, of the operation of
the country's banking system, the failure of the depositary bank to make
an interest charge should be regarded merely as a performance by the
depositary bank of part of its function as a cog in the banking mechan.
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ism rather than as significant of no credit extension during the period
between the receipt of the deposited check and the receipt of its proceeds.
It is true that the performance by the depositary bank of its function in
the banking mechanism by extending credit to its customer upon the
future deposit of a check is gratuitous. But the period of time during
which the bank gratuitously extends its credit and thus foregoes the
use of the amount elsewhere is very short and the amount of its
gratuitous extension of credit is small. Most checks are local and the
deposit completed within twenty-four hours; of the out-of-town checks,
the great majority are completed within two or three days. Also, com-
pared with the total of checks in which the deposit is completed and
against which, therefore, there is no extension of credit, the amount of
credit extended against checks in which the deposit is not completed is
very slight.
The period of time during which a risk of loss is assumed and the
amount upon which the risk is assumed is the same as the period and
the amount on which the bank gratuitously foregoes the use elsewhere
of the amount of credit extended. The period, it has just appeared, has
been thought to be short and the amount small; furthermore the risk
itself is slight. The deposited check will be presented, upon its present-
ment honored, and after its honoring the proceeds will be received by
the depositary bank. Drawers of checks do maintain sufficient balances,
dishonor of checks through mistake of drawees is unlikely, and the inter-
and intra-community clearing systems are practically 100 per cent ef-
ficient. If the check should be lost, stolen, forged or altered, the loss
to the bank, if any, from the happening of any one of these contingencies
has been covered by insurance. If the check should be dishonored, the
payee who deposited it has, at the time of its return, a sufficient balance
in the depositary bank to cover the returned item, or if he has not, he
will forthwith make a deposit to cover the returned item. Only in in-
stances so infrequent as to be negligible will the bank be compelled to
seek recourse against the drawer.
In respect of the making of a credit entry, the future deposit of a
check and the future deposit of a not-yet-maturing instrument are
similar whereas, the future deposit of the check and the future deposit of
the maturing instrument are dissimilar. This similarity of check to dis-
count points to the same consequence upon the receipt of a check as upon
the receipt of a not-yet-maturing instrument. But this formal similarity
seems to have no significance for credit extension. In the case of a fu-
ture deposit, the time when the bank makes a credit entry in its record
of the customer's account for the amount of the bill, note or check is
dictated solely by considerations of efficiency and economy in bank
operation, whether that time be upon the receipt of the instrument, the
receipt of the proceeds or some other time. The number of maturing
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bills and notes against which credit is not extended is small enough
so that it is more convenient to first record their receipt in a collection
register and later to record the receipt of the proceeds on the customer's
individual ledger card than to make a credit entry at once and another
entry, a debit, in the not unlikely event of dishonor of the instrument;
whereas the number of checks received is so great and the chance of dis-
honor so slight that the making of two memoranda in the case of each
check would greatly increase both the necessary personnel and the com.
plexity of bookkeeping methods without compensating advantage. The
fact, therefore, that in the case of the future deposit of checks banks
make but a single memorandum which is a credit entry made at the time
of the receipt of the check, indicates nothing but a decision as to con-
venient methods of internal bank operation.
And yet, reflects the judge, is it not true that the entries in the in-
dividual ledger card indicate the amount up to which the bank stands
ready to honor the customer's demands? The balances upon the in-
dividual ledger cards are the primary record of the bank's liabilities.
They are reflected in the general ledgers of the bank and in its balance
sheet. Moreover, the entries in the individual ledger cards are made to
disclose to tellers, bookkeepers, officers and other employees of the bank
the amount up to which the bank stands ready to honor the customer's
demands. May it not be, then, that this formal similarity is significant
of credit extension?
Thus to the judge, reflecting upon his beliefs and ideas, it seems that
the future deposit of a check is formally similar to the future deposit of
a maturing instrument in all respects save in the making of the credit
entry. This is not necessarily because the instruments look alike, but
because the circumstances surrounding their receipt by the bank are
similar. It seems, too, that the future deposit of a check differs in all
respects, save in the making of the credit entry, from the future deposit
of a not-yet-maturing instrument. However, the motives which lead to
the future deposit of a check are so different from the motives underlying
the future deposit of a maturing instrument, that the consequences of
the formal similarities between these two deposits are not clear.
If credit is not extended immediately upon the making of a future
deposit of a check, is it extended thereafter when the depositary bank
allows interest to the customer? There is reason to believe that the
depositary bank does allow credit to the customer or at least does stand
ready to honor his demands for the amount of the check received as a
future deposit from the moment the bank allows interest on the future
deposit. True, as in the case of the future deposit of a not-yet-maturing
bill or note, the bank has not yet received the medium and the deposit is
still a future and not a present one. But the allowance of interest in-
dicates that the bank has received what it wanted and can use in the way
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of its business, and that, consequently, it is ready to attach to the future
deposit of the check at least some of the consequences of a present de-
posit or of a future deposit of a bill or note in which credit has been ex-
tended. The particular consequence which it does attach is the payment
of interest which, indeed, is the earmark of that relation between bank
and customer which includes the drawing and honoring of checks. This
consequence is peculiarly significant because it is also the earmark
peculiar to deposits in which the bank has received the medium or has
extended credit and does, as a matter of course, stand ready to honor the
customer's orders. Furthermore, in the case of the future deposit of a
non-maturing bill or note, if interest is paid by the bank on the customer's
balance, in computing the balance on which interest is allowed the
amount of credit extended against the bill or note is included. The allow-
ance of interest in the case of a future deposit of a check, therefore, sug-
gests that the consequence of credit extension should be attached to the
future deposit of a check not only because interest is allowed on present
deposits but also because interest is allowed in the case of credit exten-
sion. On the other hand, it is true that the allowance of "interest" is
often a disguised bonus to the customer for keeping his account at the
bank. As such, it indicates nothing as to whether the bank stands ready
to honor the customer's demands up to the amount on which interest
is allowed either upon the future deposit of a bill or note or of a check
or, indeed, upon the deposit of a medium of exchange.
If the depositary bank has an availability schedule and if the time
specified in it for the amount of a check becoming available arrives be-
fore the check has, in fact, been honored and its proceeds received by
the depositary, is credit extended from the time the amount becomes
available? An availability schedule is a set of rules for classifying the
checks which the bank receives from its customers with reference to the
points on which the checks are drawn and for specifying the time when
the future deposits of checks of each class shall be treated as present
deposits in making cost analyses and in computing the sum up to which
the customer's demands will be honored. In the preparation of an
availability schedule, the time specified for the availability of each class
of checks is based generally upon the average time required for checks
to reach the drawee bank by mail plus the time required for the de-
positary bank to receive the proceeds in the form of bank credit. Some-
times the time specified in the availability schedule is sufficiently ex-
tended to include the average time required for a notice of dishonor to
reach the depositary. Consequently, a particular check may become
available either before or after it has been honored and either before or
after the depositary bank has received its proceeds.
What weight should be attached to the arrival of the day of avail-
ability in determining whether credit has been extended from that day?
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The operation of the banking system includes the preparation by in-
dividual banks of availability schedules. Such a schedule sets up a
model of behavior with respect to the time for honoring the customer's
demands against a particular deposited item. In the operation of the
bank the model is, for the most part, conformed to. Consequently, the
statement in a schedule that a particular item is available on a par-
ticular date indicates that, in fact, the bank stands ready to honor the
customer's demands from and after that date.
It is true that in respect of the future deposit of a particular check,
the extension of credit from and after its availability date and the con-
comitant assumption of risk, when the check has not yet been honored,
or, if it has, when its proceeds have not yet been received by the de-
positary, are not compensated for by an interest charge as they would be
in the case of the future deposit of a not-yet-maturing bill or note. It
is also true that a deposit, when the depositary has received purchasing
power, does not involve any extension of credit or risk, whereas the in-
complete future deposit does. Yet if it is judged that the loss of interest
and the risk of loss would be negligible, were credit extended and 'risk
assumed from the moment of deposit, it obviously would be judged far
more negligible if credit is extended in the brief interval between the
time for honoring the customer's demands indicated in the availability
schedule and the actual reception of the proceeds of any particular check
whose progress may have been slower than the average. Furthermore,
an extension of credit and the concomitant risk of loss are more than
compensated for by the large number of checks, the proceeds of which
are received by the depositary prior to the time when they become avail-
able to the customers of the depositary according to its schedule.
Is credit extended by the depositary bank to its customer in the case
of a future deposit of a check from the time that credit upon the check
is extended to the depositary by a bank, the correspondent to which the
check has been sent in the course of the process of collection? It may
be that there is no extension of credit to the customer upon the receipt
of the check nor upon the allowance of interest to the customer nor upon
the arrival of a day specified in the availability schedule and yet that
there is such an extension when the bank itself receives a credit exten-
sion, whether or not that credit extension is contemporaneous with any
other event. This extension of credit to the depositary bank by a corres-
pondent against a check whose proceeds have not yet been received and
for the amount of which the correspondent is not ready to honor on the
ground that the deposit has been completed, may begin, if it occurs at
all, from the moment the check is received and credited, from the moment
the depositary is allowed interest on the amount of the check or from
the moment the amount of the check becomes available according to the
availability schedule of the correspondent. From which of these mom-
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ents, if any, credit is extended to the depositary by its correspondent de-
pends, it seems, upon the conclusions already reached as to whether the
depositary extends credit to its customers upon the receipt of the check,
upon the allowance of interest to the customer or upon the arrival of
the day of availability. There is no reason to think that the considera-
tions which might determine the extension of credit by the correspondent
to its customer, the depositary, will differ from the considerations which
might determine whether the depositary extends credit to its customer.
Recapitulation of these considerations is unnecessary. The question is
whether, if credit is extended to the depositary by another bank, the
depositary from that moment, whenever it occurs, extends credit to its
customer.
A withholding of credit by the depositary bank after it has itself re-
ceived credit would seem to be unreasonable. A bank's business is the
loaning and borrowing of money. It accepts the future deposit of a
check as a means toward securing purchasing power, which will be useful
to it in the furtherance of its business. The withholding of credit from
its customers when it has itself received credit, would result in an added
profit at the expense of the customer. The bank would, upon the basis
of the customer's deposit, have gained the use of purchasing power, in
effect the "proceeds" of the check, while the customer has received
nothing from the bank in return. Moreover, a reason for not extending
credit up to this point-the point at which credit has been extended to
the depositary-namely, that the extension would result in a loss of
interest to the bank through the tying up of its own funds which might
profitably be employed elsewhere, is now removed, since an amount of
money equal to the amount of the check deposited is now available
through the credit extension of the correspondent.
But, on the other hand, the risk to the depositary bank of dishonor
of the check is not reduced by the extension of credit to the depositary
bank by the correspondent. Subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank will result in the debiting of the depositary's account by
the correspondent in an amount equal to the credit extended, whether or
not the depositary bank can recoup this loss from the customer. Why
should the bank run this risk of loss without compensation? It is true
that the withholding of credit extension to the customer after credit has
been extended to the depositary may, in particular cases, result in a
slight profit to the latter. But this profit, if there be one, is no more
than compensation to the bank for bearing its share of the cost of carry-
ing on the clearing and collection operations of the country's banking
system.
But, the judge reflects, to what decision, preferred claim or dividend,
do these economic ideas lead?
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3. Beliefs or ideas in the accepted legal literature as to whether the custo-
mer is granted or denied a preferred claim.
In the stream of consciousness of the introspective jurist's judge are
there any cases in which there were rulings on "like" claims made upon
records "like" those in either the Vavoudis or the Smith & Setron Printing
Company cases? The claims supposed in the question for which an
answer is sought is a preference for the amount of the check, and there-
fore no case will be "like" unless it discloses a ruling upon a claim for a
preference. Since there is little room for disagreement as to whether a
case discloses a ruling allowing or disallowing a preferred claim, the
judge's only difficulty in determining what cases are "like" will be in
deciding whether the record upon which the ruling is made is "like" either
of the records supposed in the question.', He makes this decision of
likeness or dissimilarity by comparing, in respect of their likeness in
appearance, the "facts" in the record in the case urged to be an earlier
"like" case, as they are reflected in the law reports, with the "facts" in
the cases supposed in the question. Unfortunately, but not unexpectedly,
all of the earlier cases differed from the records supposed to be before
the court at the very least in the form of the stipulations printed on the
deposit. slip or in the passbook.
The law reports, however, do reveal cases in which, upon facts more
or less like those in the records supposed to be before the court, there
15. There are many classes of cases which the jurist's judge believes not to be "like"
the Vavoudis and Smith & Setron Printing Company cases; for example: cases in which
it is for the proceeds of an instrument other than a check that the customer is seeking a
preferred claim against the assets of his insolvent depositary bank: Central Nat. Bank of
Lincoln v. First Nat. Bank of Gering, 115 Neb. 444, 216 N. W. 302 (1917) (note); Paulk
v. Union Banking Co., 46 Ga. App. 815, 169 S. E. 313 (1913) (sight draft); Messenger
v. Carroll Trust & Savings Bank, 193 Iowa 608, 187 N. W. 545 (1922) (sight draft);
In re Liquidation of Canal Bank & Trust Co., 181 La. 856, 160 So. 609 (1935) (sight
draft); In re Bank of Minnesota, 75 Minn. 184, 77 N. W. 797 (1899) (sight draft); Love
v. Elevator Co., 162 Miss. 773, 139 So. 857 (1932) (sight draft); Cottondale Planting
Co. v. Dielstadt Bank, 220 Mo. App. 265, 286 S. W. 425 (1926) (sight draft); Matter of
International Milling Co., 259 N. Y. 77, 181 N. E. 54 (1932) (sight draft); cases in which
it is a bank which is the customer seeking a preferred claim against the assets of its in.
solvent depositary bank for the proceeds of checks sent it in the course of collection:
Commercial Bank of Pennsylvania v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50 (1893); Brusegaard v,
Ueland, 72 Minn. 283, 75 N. W. 228 (1898); National Butchers and Drovers' Bank v.
Hubbell, 117 N. Y. 384, 22 N. E. 1031 (1889); cases in which it is for the proceeds of a
check which reduced the liabilities rather than increased the assets of the depositary
bank that the customer is seeking a preferred claim against the assets of his insolvent
depositary bank: Therrill v. Fogal, 107 Fla. 685, 148 So. 199 (1933); Maged v. Bank
of United States, 234 App. Div. 295, 254 N. Y. Supp. 569 (2nd Dep't, 1932); cases In
which, upon the depositary bank's insolvency, it is in effect to secure a preference over
other customers that the customer seeks to recover the proceeds of a check from a solvent
collecting bank: Leonardi v. Chase Nat. Bank, 11 F. Supp. 85 (E. D. N. Y. 1935);
Andrews v. First Nat. Bank of Tampa, 115 Fla. 67, 155 So. 143 (1934).
1935] DRAWING AGAINST UNCOLLECTED CHECKS 23
were rulings upon the allowance of a preference to the customer for the
amount of the check. It is what is said in the opinions in these cases as
to the significance of facts and evidence that determines which of these
cases were more and which less like the cases supposed to be before the
court. The opinions in these more-like cases state propositions which
tell or indicate whether a preference should be allowed the customer upon
"facts" which are more-like those in the Vavoudis and Smith & Setron
Printing Company cases. These propositions state ideas accepted as
true which are peculiarly relevant. In addition there are found cases in
which the "facts" were less-like those in the cases supposed in the ques-
tion, the opinions in which, however, contained propositions stating or
from which it may be deduced that a preference should be allowed or
disallowed. These propositions are also relevant; but to them is usually
accorded less weight than to ideas stated in the cases which are more-
like the cases supposed in the question. Many others are found in which
rulings or "facts" were not at all like the cases supposed to be before
the court, whose opinions stated ideas indicating in some fashion how
these cases should be decided. But these propositions, though relevant,
are usually accorded so little weight that the judge takes little or no
account of them. Furthermore, the ideas stated in the not-at-all-like
cases are entirely consistent with the doctrines stated in both the more-
like and the less-like cases.
The legal ideas, then, are taken from twenty cases'0 whose records
were, by the standard described, more-like and from eight cases' 7 whose
16. Equitable Trust Co. v. Rochling, 275 U. S. 248 (1927); Latzko v. Equitable Trust
Co., 275 U. S. 254 (1927); Beal v. City of Somerville, 50 Fed. 647 (C. C. A. 1st, 1892);
Quin v. Earle, 95 Fed. 728 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1899); In re Jarmulowsky, 249 Fed. 319
(C. C. A. 2d, 1918), aft'g, 243 Fed. 632 (S. D. N. Y. 1917); Illinois Central Rr. v.
Rawlings, 66 F. (2d) 146 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933); Bassett v. Mechanics Bank, 117 Conn.
407, 168 AtL 12 (1933); Andrew v. Marshalltown State Bank, 204 Iowa 1190, 216 N. W.
723 (1927); Andrew v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 214 Iowa 1199, 243 N. W. 542
t1932); In re Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 162 So. 644 (La. 1935); Matter
of Vavoudis, 141 Misc. 823, 252 N. Y. Supp. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd without opinion,
233 App. Div. 672, 249 N. Y. Supp. 870, 233 App. Div. 814, 250 N. Y. Supp. 797 (1st
Dep't, 1931) ; Baker-Cammack Textile Corp. v. Hood, 205 N. C. 782, 175 S. E. 151 (1934) ;
Howe v. Akron Savings Bank Co., 16 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N. S.) 320, 31 C. D. 516 (1905);
Smith & Setron Printing Co. v. State, 40 Ohio App. 32, 178 N. E. 211 (1931); First
State Bank v. Lisles, 144 OkIa. 156, 289 Pac. 1105 (1930); Crouch v. Tarver, 173 S. C.
172, 175 S. E. 273 (1934); Williams v. Cox, 97 Tenn. 555, 37 S. W. 282 (1896), rev'd
on rehearing on other grounds, 99 Tenn. 403, 42 S. W. 3 (1897); Fine v. Receiver of
Dickenson County Bank, 163 Va. 157, 175 S. E. 863 (1934); Washington Shoe Mfg. Co.
v. Duke, 126 Wash. 510, 218 Pac. 232 (1923); Beehive Marketeria v. Citizens Bank, 126
Wash. 526, 218 Pac. 237 (1923).
17. City of Philadelphia v. Eckels, 98 Fed. 485 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1896); Goshorn v.
Murray, 197 Fed. 407 (W. D. Pa. 1912), rev'd on other grounds, 210 Fed. 880 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1914); Hardesty v. Smith, 159 So. 522 (Fla. 1935); Hogansville Banking Co. v.
Wilkinson, 42 Ga. App. 281, 154 S. E. 789 (1930); Macon Grocery Co. v. Citizens' Bank,
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records were less-like the records supposed to be before the court. In
all of these cases, the report supports the conclusion either that the record
justified a finding or that the court assumed that the record justified a
finding of the following facts. A checking account customer of a com-
mercial bank endorsed and delivered to the bank a third person's check
of which he was the holder, accompanied by a deposit slip or its equival-
ent. An entry of the amount of the check was made on the credit side
of the customer's passbookor of his individual ledger card or of both.
The bank subsequently failed and the proceeds of the check, collected by
the receiver, increased the bank's assets. The customer claimed and
was either granted or denied a preferred claim.
A doctrine stated in all of these cases is that, if a checking account
customer of a commercial bank endorses and delivers to the bank a
check of a third person of which he is the holder, accompanied by a
deposit slip, and if the bank makes an entry of the amount of the check
on the credit side of his passbook or of his individual ledger card or of
both, the check is "deposited"; but if no credit entry is made and the
check, in passing through the bank, is handled in a manner similar to
that in which a third person's bills of exchange and promissory notes en-
dorsed and delivered by the customer to the bank just before maturity
are handled, the check is "received for collection." The legal con-
sequences following upon the handing in of a check which is "deposited"
may be the same as those following upon the handing in of a check
which is "received for collection" or the legal consequences of the two
transactions may differ.
Another doctrine stated in all of these cases is that when a check is
"deposited" a bargain is made between bank and customer, the bank's
side of which is, in part, an executory promise to honor the customer's
checks or orders in an amount at least equal to the amount of the check.
Whether the bank promises to honor the customer's checks or orders
from and after the receipt by it of the check "deposited," from and
after the receipt by it and the application to its own use of the proceeds
of the check, or from and after the happening of some other event, de-
pends upon the terms of the promise as expressed or implied in fact. In
determining what the terms of the bank's promise are, there should be
taken into account: the promise expressed orally or in writing by the
bank; the form of the endorsement, whether general or testrictive; the
terms of the stipulation printed upon the deposit slip or in the passbook
and purporting to state part of the consequences to follow the delivery
of the check; the fact that the customer has orhas not generally drawn
42 Ga. App. 74, 155 S. E. 57 (1930); Olinger v. Sanders, 92 Ind. App, 358, 174 N. E..
513 (1931); Baker v. Orme, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N. S.) 289, 17 C. D. 465 (1905), afi'd, 74
Ohio State 337, 78 N. E. 439 (1906); Raynor v. Scandinavian-American Bank, 122 Wagh.
150, 210 Pac. 499 (1922).
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against "deposited" checks; the regular course of business between the
customer and the bank, and the regular course of business.
The doctrine that when a check is "deposited" (and at least when the
bank regularly honors checks drawn by the customer against checks "de-
posited" by him before their collection) there is a presumption that the
bank promises to honor the customer's checks and orders from and after
the receipt by it of the check "deposited" is stated in twenty-four,8 of
the cases. The other four"9 state a different doctrine, that when a
check is "deposited" (though the bank regularly honors checks drawn
by the customer against checks "deposited" by him before their collec-
tion) there is a presumption that the bank promises to honor the custo-
mer's checks and orders from and after the receipt by it and the applica-
tion to its own use of the proceeds of the check.
A doctrine expressed in all of the cases is that that part of the bank's
promise which specifies when the customer's check shall be honored is
determinative of the customer's position after insolvency. If the time
specified is immediately upon the "deposit" of the check, the bank is
under a present obligation as soon as the "deposit" is made to honor the
customer's checks or orders. The bank has created and put at the dis-
posal of the customer at once, as completely as if it were in his pocket,
that form of money or purchasing power called checking account credit
or deposit currency, the obtaining of which was the objective of the
customer in making his bargain, i.e., in depositing the check for credit.
Consequently the customer, upon the deposit of the check, acquires at
once the status of a depositor and, however soon thereafter the bank may
be closed, its assets sequestered and a receiver appointed, the customer
receives upon the distribution of assets no more than the dividend ac-
corded to depositors. The bank having performed its side of the bargain,
neither it nor its receiver is obligated to return the "deposited" check,
the consideration received by the bank for its performance. But when
the bank's promise specifies that the time for the honoring of the custo-
mer's check is from and after the receipt by it and application to its
18. Equitable Trust Co. v. Rochling; Latzko v. Equitable Trust Co.; Quin v. Earle;
In re Jarmulowsky; Illinois Central Rr. v. Rawlings; Bastt v. Mechanics Bank; Andrew
v. Security Trust & Savings Bank; Andrew v. Marshalltown State Bank; In re Liquidation
Gf Hibernia Bank & Trust Co.; Matter of Vavoudis; Baker-Cammack Textile Corp. v.
Hood; Smith & Setron Printing Co. v. State; Howe v. Akron Savings Bank Co.; First
State Bank v. Lisles; Crouch v. Tarver; Williams v. Cox; Fine v. Receiver of Dickenson
County Bank; Washington Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Duke; Beehive Marketeria v. Citizens Bank,
all supra note 16; Macon Grocery Co. v. Citizens' Bank; Hogansville Banking Co. v.
Wilkinson; Olinger v. Sanders; Baker v. Orme; Raynor v. Scandinavia-American Bank,
all supra note 17.
19. Beal v. City of Somerville, 50 Fed. 647 (C. C. A. 1sts 1892); City of Philadelphia
v. Eckels; Goshorn v. Murray; Hardesty v. Smith, all supra note 17. There is no in-
timation in these cases of what evidence rebuts such a presumption.
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own use of the proceeds of the check, then the bank is not under a pres-
ent obligation to honor the customer's checks or orders. It has not
created and put at the disposal of the customer that form of money or
purchasing power called checking account credit or deposit currency,
which was the objective of the customer in making his bargain, i.e., in de-
positing the check for credit. Nor is a present obligation imposed upon
the bank until the receipt and application to the bank's use of the pro-
ceeds of the check. Consequently, until that time the customer does not
acquire the status of a depositor and, if before that time the bank is
closed, its assets sequestered and a receiver appointed, the customer does
not receive upon the distribution of assets the dividend accorded to de-
positors. The bank has not performed its side of the bargain and is no
longer capable of performing it, and therefore either it or its receiver
is obligated to return the consideration received by the bank for its un-
performed promise, i.e., the "deposited" check or its proceeds.
It is clear from the legal doctrines which have just been stated that
the answer to the question of preference or dividend depends upon the
bargain which the parties are found to have made. But bargains ex-
pressed in words are rare. For that reason, in finding the bargain made,
it is more common than not to resort to the mechanism of presumption.
It will have been noted that the doctrine expressed in twenty-four 8 of
the cases is that there is presumption that the bank promises to honor
the customer's checks and orders from and after the receipt by it of the
check "deposited"; and that the doctrine in four 0 of the cases is that
there is a presumption that the bank promises to honor the customer's
checks and orders from and after the receipt of the "deposited" check
and the application to the bank's use of the proceeds. If the twenty-eight
cases agreed upon what the presumption as to the terms of the bank's
promise is, and upon what facts rebut the presumption, it might not be
so difficult to anticipate the answer to the question. Of the facts which
may rebut the presumption, the most conspicuous and the most dis-
cussed is the stipulation printed on the deposit slip or in the passbook
which purports to state part of the consequences to follow the delivery
of the check. It is agreed that the clause or clauses of such a stipula-
tion may rebut the presumption. Unfortunately, there is no agreement
as to what form the stipulation must take to rebut the presumption.
In twelve20 of the twenty-eight more- or less-like cases, the records dis-
20. In re Jarmulowsky, 249 Fed. 319 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918), aff'g, 243 Fed, 632 (S. D.
N. Y. 1917); Illinois Central Rr. v. Rawlings, 66 F. (2d) 146 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933);
Bassett v. Mechanics Bank, 117 Conn. 407, 168 AtI. 12 (1933); Hogansville Banking Co.
v. Wilkinson, 42 Ga. App. 281, 154 S. E. 789 (1930); Macon Grocery Co. v. Citizens'
Bank, 42 Ga. App. 74, 155 S. E. 57 (1930); Olinger v. San~ders, 92 Ind. App. 358, 174
N. E. 513 (1931); Andrew v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 214 Iowa 1199, 243 N. W.
542 (1932); Matter of Vavoudis, 141 Misc. 823, 252 N. Y. Supp. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1931),
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dosed a stipulation printed upon the deposit slip or the passbook which
purported to state part of the consequences to follow the delivery of the
check. In seven of these cases21 the stipulations were identical; in the
remaining five, the stipulations were neither identical with those in the
first seven cases nor with each other.
In the first of the five cases, there was printed upon the passbook:2
"Deposits of currency or coin may be drawn against after deposit, but de-
posits of checks shall not be drawn against until collected."
In allowing the customer a preference, Hough, J., writing for the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the 2d Circuit, said:2-4
"In the absence of any special agreement between these depositors and their
bank, the title to the checks would have passed to the bank, and the bank
become merely a debtor to the depositor for amount entered in the passbook.
... On the other hand is the notice in the passbook which undoubtedly con-
stituted part of the original contract between banker and depositor .... There-
fore both of these proceedings present the same question, which is whether a
depositor who is credited with the face of checks, which he has agreed not
to draw against until they shall have been collected, has by the act of deposit
parted with the title to the checks in question or other such negotiable paper.
It is obvious (and is indeed admitted) that unless there was such parting with
title the relation of the bank to the depositor in respect of such collectible items
is that of agent. Of course, if the agency had been fulfilled by collection of
the checks before Mlay 11th, no such question could be presented, for the
moment the bank got money on the checks the relation of debtor and creditor
arose.... But here, when petition was filed and the bank superintendent took
possession, the agency (if it existed) was terminated before collection effected,
and the depositors can follow their own property or its proceeds wherever
they can find it, in the absence of supervening superior rights .... And it is
our opinion that what the parties here meant was to create as to everything
but cash the relation of principal and agent. This inference we draw from
these undisputed facts: No depositor had any right (as distinct from an
occasional and gratuitous privilege) to draw against anything but cash; this
arrangement was advantageous to the bank; and the right to summarily charge
back uncollected items, even after full apparent credit on deposit, is thought
aff'd without opinion, 233 App. Div. 672, 249 N. Y. Supp. 870, 233 App. Div. 814, 250
N. Y. Supp. 797 (Ist Dep't, 1931); Baker-Cammack Textile Corp. v. Hood, 205 N. C. 782,
175 S. E. 151 (1934); Smith & Setron Printing Co. v. State, 40 Ohio App. 32, 178 N. E.
211 (1931); Fine v. Receiver of Dickenson County Bank, 163 Va. 157, 175 S. E. 863
(1934); Raynor v. Scandinavian-American Bank- 122 Wash. 150, 210 Pac. 499 (1922).
21. Illinois Central Rr. v. Rawlings; Hogansville Banking Co. v. Wilkinson; Macon
Grocery Co. v. Citizens' Bank; Olinger v. Sanders; Andrew v. Security Trust and Savings
Bank; Baker-Cammack Textile Corp. v. Hood; Fine v. Receiver of Dickenson County
Bank, all supra note 20.
22. In re Jarmulowsky; Bassett v. Mechanics Bank; Matter of Vavoudis; Smith &
Setron Printing Co. v. State; Raynor v. Scandinavian-American Bank, all supra note 20.
23. In re Jarmulowsky, 249 Fed. 319, 320 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
24. Id. at 321, 322.
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inconsistent with any intent on the bank's part to become the owner of such
items as those under consideration.
"We conclude, therefore, that the course of business shown herein is in
effect the same as though the checks aforesaid had been specifically indorsed
'For collection and deposit to the account of' the depositors."
In the second of these cases there was printed upon the deposit slip:26
"AU checks credited are subject to payment."
The court, denying the customer a preference, said:
20
"By great preponderance of authority, where a depositor of checks or drafts
is given credit as cash against which he has the right to draw, in the absence
of an agreement or understanding to the contrary or proof of circumstances
from which such an understanding may be inferred, the presumption is that
title to the paper passes to the bank, although this is rebuttable by proof
showing a contrary intention of the parties at the time of the deposit ...
Also, according to the prevailing view, the fact that deposits are credited
subject to payment or that the bank has the right to charge dishonored paper
back to the depositor instead of proceeding against the maker, does not militate
against the passing of title to it. This right is regarded as merely that of an
indorsee against an indorser and hence not inconsistent with ownership."
In a third case of this group, a case less-like the records supposed
to be before the court, there was printed on the deposit slip the following
stipulation :27
"Checks on this bank and on other Tacoma clearing house banks will be
credited conditionally. If not found good at the close of business, they will
be charged back to depositors and the latter notified of the fact. In making
this deposit the depositor hereby assents to the foregoing conditions."
In a decision which, on other grounds, granted the customers a pref-
erence, Fullerton, J., speaking for the Washington Supreme Court,
said :21
".. - deposit slips amounted to nothing more than an agreement between
the bank and each of the several depositors that, if the check deposited was
not found to be good at the close of business on the day of the deposit, it
could be charged back to the depositor. Such an agreement we held in Vickers
v. Machinery Warehouse & Sales Co., 111 Wash. 576, 191 Pac. 869, did not
constitute a deposit for collection, but was a sale of the paper to the bank
and passed title to the paper, subject only to the right of rescission if the paper
subsequently proved to be without value."
In the fourth case, Matter of Vavoudis, there was printed upon the
deposit slip :29
25. Bassett v. Mechanics Bank, 117 Conn. 407, 409, 168 At. 12, 13 (1933).
26. Id. at 413, 414, 168 AtI. at 14, 15.
27. Raynor v. Scandinavian-American Bank, 122 Wash. 150, 152, 210 Pac, 499, g00
(1922).
28. Id. at 158, 210 Pac. at 502.
29. 141 Misc. 823, 824, 252 N. Y. Supp. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
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"All items credited shall be subject to actual receipt of final payment by
this bank, which shall not be held responsible for its delay or failure to
present, collect, or protest any item."
In the only opinion handed down in the litigation, Lydon, J., at Special
Term, allowing the customer a preference, said:"0
"Ordinarily the bank would have become the owner of the check deposited
and a debtor to its depositor for the amount of the deposit. But here the
deposit slip bore the following provision.... Manifestly these provisions were
inconsistent with the rights and obligations which would normally have ensued
from the deposit of the check. They were inconsistent with the theory of
ownership in the bank. They negatived the idea that the bank became a
debtor to its depositor upon acceptance of the deposit. They were consistent
only with the theory that the bank took the check for collection and that
in the execution of its agency it was to be relieved from the customary re-
sponsibilities."
In the last of the five cases, the Smith & Setron Printing Company
case, the following clause was printed in the customer's passbook: 31
"Checks on this bank will be credited conditionally. If not found good
at dose of business, they may be charged back to depositors and the latter
notified of the fact. Checks on other city banks may be carried over for
presentation through the clearing house on the following day.
"In receiving items on deposit payable elsewhere than in Cleveland this bank
assumes no responsibility for the failure of any of its direct or indirect
collecting agents, and shall only be held liable when proceeds in actual funds
or solvent credits shall have come into its possession. Under these conditions
items previously credited may be charged back to the depositor's account.
Items lost in transit may be charged back to depositor's account pending re-
ceipt of duplicates. Unless otherwise instructed, items may be mailed to
drawee banks. Unpaid items may be returned by mail at depositor's r isk. In
making deposits the depositor hereby assents to the foregoing conditions."
In denying the customer a preference, Sherick, J., writing for the
Ohio Court of Appeals for the 8th Appellate District, said:32
"There can be no question that had these checks been deposited for collec-
tion, title would not have passed to the bank... but the facts in this case
do not disclose that such was done; nor can it be inferred, unless the notice
appearing in the deposit book, just quoted, so provides. The fact that a
bank has a right to charge back a dishonored check as against its customer's
account is not alone sufficient to establish the fact that it took the paper for
collection purposes only.
"It is well stated in the case of Raynor v. Scandinavian-A merican Ban.
that in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary the deposit of a
check in a bank constitutes not a deposit for collection merely, but is a sale
30. Ibid.
31. 40 Ohio App. 32, 34, 178 N. E. 211, 212 (1931).
32. Id. at 35, 178 N. E. at 212.
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of the paper to the bank, and passes title to the bank, subject only to the
right of rescission if the paper subsequently proves to be without value ...
We are advised that it is otherwise held in some jurisdictions, which adhere
to the old-considered rule that the relationship is that of bailor and bailee,
but we believe that it may now be safely stated that the better rule, recog-
nizing the necessity created by the enormous increase in checking and com-
mercial paper, should be followed."
"Considering now the deposit book 'Notice,' we are unable to understand
that its provisions are other than a statement of the general law as herein
previously announced. It will be noted that these deposits are to be credited,
not received for collection only, and such conditions as are therein stated per-
tain only to such checks as shall be dishonored. In the matter of the checks
in question, there was no dishonor. The checks were paid when presented and
the conditional credit clause did not apply."
In seven 2 of the twelve cases it will be recalled that the stipulations
upon the deposit slip or the passbook were said to be identical. It is
true that there were minor variations: the use of a singular in some
stipulations and a plural in others; the use of the word "agent" in some
stipulations and of "correspondent" in the others; the use, without a
change of meaning, of "and" in some stipulations and "or" in others
and the addition of the words "at any time" in some of the stipulations.
Subject to the variations just stated, the stipulation common to these
cases was as follows:
"In receiving items for deposit or collection, this Bank acts only as de-
positor's collecting agent and assumes no responsibility beyond the exercise
of due care. All items are credited subject to final payment in cash or solvent
credits. This Bank will not be liable for the defaults or negligence of its duly
selected correspondents nor for losses in transit, and each correspondent so
selected shall not be liable except for its own negligence. This Bank or its
correspondents, may send items, directly or indirectly, to any bank including
the payor, and accept its draft or credit as conditional payment in lieu of
cash; and it may charge back any item before final payment, whether re-
turned or not, also any item drawn on this Bank not good at close of business
on day deposited."
.An examination of these seven cases indicates that there are two
doctrines as to the effect of this stipulation. Three3 of the seven cases
express the doctrine that this stipulation does not rebut the presumption
that the bank promises to honor the customer's checks and orders from
and after the receipt by it of the check "deposited." Quotations from
the opinions in each of these cases follow.
In ruling that, notwithstanding this stipulation, the customer was not
33. Illinois Central Rr. v. Rawlings; Olinger v. Sanders; Andrew v. Security Trust
& Savings Bank, all supra note 20.
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entitled to a preference, the majority of the Supreme Court of Iowa,
speaking through Morling, J., said:3 4
"As we have seen, laying aside the 'notice,' the acts of the parties at the
time created the relationships of debtor and creditor and of endorser and
endorsee. The sentence upon which interveners base their contention is fol-
lowed by the statement 'the items are credited subject to final payment.'
There is the further statement that 'the bank may charge back any items....
Also any item drawn on this bank not good at dose of business on day
deposited.' There are specific provisions designed to relieve the bank from
faults which otherwise might disable it from enforcing endorsements.
"It is not disputed that if the deposit had been of cash the bank would
have taken title to the cash and interveners would have been its creditors for
the amount. Literally, however, the sentence in question would, on interveners'
contention, apply to cash, for it reads: 'In receiving items for deposit or
collection this bank acts only as depositor's collecting agent.' The language
is in the alternative: 'In receiving for deposit . . . this bank acts only as
depositor's collecting agent.' It is evident that the words 'deposit or collection'
could not have been intended distributively to create the technical relationship
of principal and agent. The notice in express terms recognizes that the items
are credited and that drafts or credits resulting from them are 'conditional
payment.' The notice recognizes that the bank obtains title to the items
deposited and that it has given credit to the depositor for them. The meaning
and purpose of the notice therefore are found in the provision that the bank
'may charge back any item before final payment whether returned or not.'
That is, though the bank has given the depositor credit the credit is not final
but may be liquidated by charging back dishonored or worthless items.
"Construing the transaction in its entirety and in its connections in the
light of the well known banking practices we think that the words 'this bank
acts only as depositor's collecting agent' were not employed in a technical
sense and cannot be given the effect of defining the exact and complete legal
relationship between intervener and the bank. The bank took title to the
checks. Interveners became a depositor ...
"In the absence of any contract, this court is committed to the proposition
that the title to all deposits passes immediately to the bank. It is a matter
of common knowledge that prior to the use of the deposit contracts, such as
the one involved in this case, banks frequently found themselves in trouble on
account of the negligence of their corresponding banks in making collections.
They also found themselves in trouble because certain depositors refused to
acknowledge the charge back on items not collectible. This led to the adoption
of different contracts of the general type of the one involved in this case.
"They are all contracts made for the purpose of and with the intention of
protecting the bank....
"This particular case must be determined by the interpretation to be placed
upon the contract. We have no statute on the subject. Our previous deci-
sions have clearly laid down the general principle involved, and the only
34. Andrew v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 214 Iowa 1199, 1206, 1203, 1209, 243 N. W.
542, 545, 546, 547 (1932).
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inquiry here is to what extent does this contract modify the general principle?
We have then left only an interpretation of the contract. Inasmuch as it can
only be construed to mean a modification of the general rule in this state to
the extent of allowing a charge back and protecting the bank from the results
of the negligence of collecting corresponding banks, it necessarily follows that
the title to these checks passed to the bank, subject only to the right to charge
back uncollectible items."
The Appellate Court of Indiana, in denying the customer a preference
in a case which was, however, less-like the records supposed, stated: 85
"The rule applying to bank deposits in this state, in the absence of some
special agreement, was well stated by Jordan, C. J., in the case of Union
National Bank v. Citizens' Bank, supra, as follows:
"'The rule which prevails and is generally recognized in regard to bank
deposits is that, where a deposit is made in a bank in the ordinary course of
business, either of money, or of drafts or checks received and credited as money,
the title to the money or to the drafts and checks deposited, in the absence
of any special agreement or direction, passes to the bank, and the relation of
debtor and creditor arises between the depositor and the bank, without any
element of a trust entering into the case.' . . .
it... unless the statement upon the deposit slip had the effect of limiting
the deposit of the state voucher to a deposit for collection only, it must be
held that the title thereto passed to the bank.
"Although there is not entire uniformity among the courts, the weight of
authority supports the view that while a statement on the deposit slip, or in
the passbook, such as here involved, should be considered in determining the
intention of the depositor and the bank, it is not conclusive.
"The weight of authority also sustains the conclusion that the title to the
voucher in this case passed to the bank; that, paraphrasing the language of
the court in the case of Raynor v. Scandinavian-American Bank, supra, 'the
condition written on the deposit slip amounted to nothing more than an agree-
ment between the Huntingburg Bank and the appellant, that if the state
voucher deposited was found not to be good it would be charged back to the
bank,' would not prevent the passing of title.
"The effect of the right to charge back a check to the depositor, on passing
of title to the bank, was disposed of by Justice Stone, in the case of Douglas
v. Federal Reserve Bank, supra, in this language: 'While there is not entire
uniformity of opinion, the weight of authority supports the view that upon
the deposit of paper unrestrictedly indorsed, and credit of the amount to the
depositor's account, the bank becomes the owner of the paper, notwithstanding
a custom or agreement to charge the paper back to the depositor in the event
of dishonor.'"
The effect of the stipulation was said by Judge Hutcheson to be the
same in a case in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
35. Olinger v. Sanders, 92 Ind. App. 358, 363, 366, 369, 174 N. E. 513, 514, $15, 516
(1931).
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which, however, because of the unexpressed views of his colleagues, the
customer was allowed a preference. Judge Hutcheson said:"0
"It remains only to determine whether the items aggregating $279.81 were,
because of the notice on the deposit slip, special deposits.
"The writer does not think they were. He thinks the only purpose of this
agreement, its only effect, was to save expressly to the bank the right to
reverse the credit entries, in case the items were not collected. These deposits
are referred to in the findings as deposits made under a special arrangement.
The record, however, shows that they were deposited just as the other deposits
were. The only evidence in support of the view that they were special deposits
is the notice printed on the back of the deposit slip. He does not think that
the character of these deposits as general deposits was at all affected by this
notice. The notice contained no reference to the title to the deposits, no
reservation against ownership in the bank in case the collection was made.
It imposed not a condition precedent to the vesting of title to the deposit in
the bank, but a condition subsequent, operating to relieve the bank from
responsibility and debt in case the collection failed. It was not effective to
convert what was otherwise a general, into a special, deposit. Washington
Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Duke, 126 Wash. 510, 218 P. 232, 37 A. L. P- 617. This
is not a case... of a collection undertaken by a bank for one not a depositor.
It is a case merely of an express reservation by the bank of the right to charge
back against a general depositor, when the collection fails, items previously
credited to him. Here ...there was no agreement, express or implied, that
the deposit should not be drawn against until collected .... On the contrary,
the paper was delivered to the bank with an unqualified endorsement giving
the depositor the unquestioned right to draw upon it.
"The majority does not agree with these views. They say that the finding
of the court is sustained by the record."
The remaining fourl of the seven cases express the other doctrine,
namely that this stipulation does rebut the presumption that the bank
promised to honor the customer's checks and orders from and after the
receipt by it of the check "deposited."
In a ruling that the customer was entitled to a preference, the Supreme
Court of Georgia said, in a case less-like the records supposed:3s
"The receipt . .. of a check drawn upon a bank in another state, upon
the condition that in doing so the bank 'acts only as depositor's collecting
agent and ... all items are credited subject to final payment, . .. and ... it
may charge back any item at any time before final payment,' created such
bank merely the agent of such depositor for the purpose of collection; and,
that relation having been terminated after the dosing of the bank of deposit,
but prior to the payment of the check by the drawer to a correspondent of
36. Illinois Central Rr. v. Rawlings, 66 F. (2d) 146, 150, 151 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
37. Hogansvlle Banking Co. v. Wilkinson; Mlacon Grocery Co. v. Citizens' Bank;
Baker-Cammack Textile Corp. v. Hood; Fine v. Receiver of Dickenson County Bank,
all supra note 20.
38. Hogansville Banking Co. v. Wilkinson, 171 Ga. 165, 154 S. E. 789, 790, 791 (1930).
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the bank of deposit, the depositor is entitled to the proceeds thereof in excess
of his indebtedness to the bank."
Seven days later the Court of Appeals of the same state granting the
customer's claim for a preference in another case less-like the records
supposed said:"
"Where checks upon other banks are deposited in a bank by a person having
a general deposit and against which he is allowed to draw checks, although
the checks may be indorsed without restriction by the depositor, and although
it may be assumed that, without more, the title to the checks passes to the
bank in which they are deposited, and that, as respects thereto, the relation
of debtor and creditor arises between the bank and the depositor . . . , yet,...
"A provision upon the deposit slips furnished by the bank to depositors,
and upon which were made the entries of deposits of the checks, to the effect
that 'in receiving items for deposit or collection this bank acts only as de-
positor's collecting agent and assumes no responsibility beyond the exercise
of due care, all items are credited subject to final payment in cash or solvent
credits' and the bank 'may charge back any item at any time before final
payment,' constitutes notice to the depositor making the deposit entries upon
these slips that the bank, in accepting the checks for deposit, does so only as
the 'depositor's agent to collect the proceeds of the checks and to deposit them
to the depositor's credit, and no contract creating the relationship of debtor
and creditor arises between the parties, but there is created a contract by
which the bank, in accepting the checks, does so as the agent of the depositor
to collect the proceeds of the checks and to afterwards deposit them to the
depositor's credit in the bank."
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, speaking through Epes, J.,
in granting the customer a preference, stated :40
"The deposit slip delivered to and accepted by Fine constituted an express
agreement that the bank should act as the agent of Fine to collect this check
and then deposit its proceeds to Fine's credit. Though it speaks of the check
being credited to Fine, it is plain that, if it is credited to him, it is to be done
merely for bookkeeping convenience, and that Fine shall acquire no rights by
virtue of its being so credited unless and until the check is paid. The bank
selected and used this form of deposit slip for its protection. But, when it
did so, it assumed the burdens thereof no less than it became entitled to its
benefits ....
"The cashier of the bank testifies that the bank would have permitted Fine
to check against this 'deposit,' but there is nothing to show that this was
communicated to Fine. Nor do we find anything in the evidence which we
think constituted a waiver either by the bank or by Fine of the contract
made between them by the delivery to him and the acceptance by him of this
deposit slip."
The same opinion was expressed by the Supreme Court of North
39. Macon Grocery Co. v. Citizens' Bank, 42 Ga. App. 74, 75, 155 S. E. 57, 58 (1930).
40. Fine v. Receiver of Dickenson County Bank, 163 Va. 157, 160, 175 S. E. 8631
864 (1934).
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Carolina, speaking through Clarkson, J., in a case less-like the records
supposed. Here, in granting the preference, the court said:
41
"When the checks and drafts were deposited by plaintiff, the following was
in the contract, made with the North Carolina Bank & Trust Company, in
part: 'In receiving items for deposit or collection, this Bank acts only as
depositor's collecting agent, and assumes no responsibility beyond the exercise
of due care. All items are credited subject to final payment in cash or solvent
credits.... It may charge back any item at any time before final payment,
whether returned or not, also any item drawn on this Bank not good at close
of business on day deposited.'
"The first question involved: Did the checks deposited in the bank under
the facts as agreed upon become the property of the bank, or, pending collec-
tion, were they held by the bank as agent for the plaintiff? We think they
were held by the bank as agent for the plaintiff. We think under all the facts
and circumstances of this case that the bank by express contract was an agent
for collection, the contract in clear language so states."
After considering the beliefs or ideas in the accepted legal literature,
the introspective jurist and his judge will, it seems, conclude that the
Court of Appeals of New York, the Supreme Court of Ohio, or any
other court, would be inclined to take as a model the judicial decisions
stated in the relevant legal doctrines and would, therefore, disallow the
customer's claim for a preference to the amount of the check, unless
the court judged that the form of the stipulation appearing in the records
was sufficient to rebut the presumption that the bank had promised to
honor the customer's checks and orders upon and after the receipt by it
of the customer's check.
4. Beliefs as to whether in the making of a decision weight ought
to be accorded to economic and legal beliefs, and as to the economic
and legal beliefs to which weight ought to be accorded.
In the mind of the jurist's judge, there is another group of beliefs
or ideas accepted as true which should be taken into account. They are
ethical or moral propositions. They attribute to a course of behavior
the quality of goodness or of causing the Good. Sound economic doc-
trines (i.e., doctrines which are believed or accepted as true) either
those holding good for all times and places, those holding good here and
now, those of an ideal but not yet existing economic order or those
deduced from any of these doctrines, whether the doctrines are laws
in the natural science sense, whether intuitive interpretations of econ-
omic phenomena or whether they are unrealized ideals, ought to be
accorded great weight in the making of a judicial ruling and in the
statement of legal doctrines. But perhaps even sound economic doc-
41. Baker-Cammack Textile Corp. v. Hood, 206 N. C. 782, 788, 175 S. E. 151, 154
,1934).
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trines, however found or invented and whatever they may be, ought not
to be accorded weight unless experiment has shown that they are in
causal relation with the Good Life or that they are not inconsistent
with the Good Life.
The more relevant of the economic propositions which ought to be
accorded weight have already been considered and it was observed that
some of them weighed on the side of preference and some on the side
of dividend. Thus, for example, there is a proposition that when a bank
extends credit against the deposit of a third person's check before it
has received the proceeds, it assumes a risk of loss for which it is not
compensated though the transaction is one in a profit economy in which
compensation for assumption of risk of loss is the rule. The economic
belief, which ought to be accorded weight, that compensation for assump-
tion of risk is the rule, will weigh on the side of no credit extension
having been made by the bank and therefore of a preference for the
customer. But there is another economic proposition that the risk in-
volved in extending credit against a third person's check is so slight
and for so short a time that it is negligible and is, as a practical matter,
disregarded. This idea, which also ought to be accorded weight, tends
to counterbalance the first economic proposition and, combined with
other beliefs, on the efficient operation of the banking system for exam-
ple, weighs on the side of an extension of credit by the bank and there-
fore a dividend for the customer. But perhaps neither of these doctrines
or ideas should be accorded any weight unless they have been proved
to be in accord with the Good Life.
In addition to the ethical or moral propositions with an economic
reference there are also ethical or moral propositions with respect to
law, i.e., judicial decisions and legal doctrines. For example, exact
precedents ought to be followed. Propositions of law found either by
a study of the facts and rulings in decided cases or in opinions, statutes
and commentaries, or propositions deduced from any of these ought to
be followed, whether the propositions of law or the deductions be gen-
eralizations or "laws" in the natural science sense or whether they be
governmental propaganda. But perhaps propositions of law, however
found and whatever they may be, ought to be followed only if experi.
ment has demonstrated that the following of the proposition of law. i.e.,
the making of the ruling required by it, is in causal relation with the
Good Life or that it is not inconsistent with the Good Life.
It appears to the judge that there are no exact precedents which
ought to be followed in making a ruling for preference or dividend.
But, as in the case of economic doctrines which ought to be accorded
weight, there are propositions of law, some of which dictate a ruling
for a preference and some of which dictate a ruling for a dividend, all
of which, however, at least if they have been shown to be in accord
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with the Good Life, ought to be followed. Thus, there is a legal doc-
trine that, upon the deposit of a third person's check, it is that part of
the bank's promise which specifies when the customer's checks shall be
honored which is determinative of the customer's position after in-
solvency. If the time at which the bank promised to honor the cus-
tomer's checks drawn against the deposited check has arrived before
the bank doses insolvent, then the customer is entitled to a dividend;
but if the time for honoring his checks has not arrived when the bank
closes insolvent the customer is entitled to a preference. One proposi-
tion of law states that there is a presumption that the bank promises
to honor the customer's checks immediately from and after the receipt
by it of the deposited check; another proposition of law states a pre-
sumption that the bank promises to honor the customer's checks from
and after the receipt by it and the application to its own use of the
proceeds of the deposited check.
But in addition to ethical or moral propositions of the sort that
economic beliefs or ideas accepted as true ought to be accorded weight
and that legal precedents and doctrines ought to be followed, there are
many other ethical or moral propositions of a more particular sort which
will Dccur to the judge. Since the problem in hand is one arising from
a business transaction, most of these propositions will be of economic
reference. Some of them are more and some of them less directly asso-
ciated with the idea of preference or dividend. A few of such ethical
or moral beliefs follow:
An insolvent's property in the hands of a receiver ought to be ratably dis-
tributed among creditors of the same class; if the property is not the in-
solvent's it should not be ratably distributed, but ought to be returned to the
person to whom it belongs.
Though a third person's check which has been deposited by a customer of
an insolvent bank some time before the bank closed insolvent ought, even
though it has not yet been collected, to be regarded as the property of the
bank, nevertheless a third person's check which has been deposited just before
the bank closed ought to be regarded as the property of the customer.
When a customer has deposited a third person's check with the expectation
that credit will be immediately extended to him for the amount of the check
and credit has been extended to him by the bank, the customer thereby ac-
quires immediately available checking account credit and the status of a
depositor and, therefore, upon an insolvent distribution of the bank's assets,
he ought to be treated as are other depositors.
The use of checking account credit ought to be encouraged. The use of
checking account credit ought not to be restricted simply because its use may
give rise to a risk of loss through dishonor of deposited checks. The presence
of the risk does no more than create the problem of its just allocation. Allo-
cation of the risk of loss incident to such business transactions, in the absence
of a different express allocation, ought to place the risk in the first instance
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on the person whose wealth is greater; on the person whose number of trans-
actions is sufficiently great so that the loss may be distributed among them
as a cost item; on the person on whom it falls according to usage and custom.
Even though a check is not a medium of exchange, yet whenever a check
which has been deposited has completely performed the function of a medium
of exchange, it ought to have the consequence of a medium.
The drawing and delivery of a check should not decrease the total of
effective demand deposits available as purchasing power for a greater time
than is absolutely necessary.
A bank ought not to be required to make unintentional loans without interest
or without an antecedent credit investigation.
If an extension of credit belongs to a class of very short term loans which
are almost always repaid when due, the bank ought to grant the extension of
credit without interest and without a credit judgment.
Reflecting upon the ethical or moral propositions which have been
stated, the jurist's judge concludes that it is not clear whether they
indicate a decision granting or a decision denying a preferred claim.
Unfortunately, he reflects, this conclusion is no more helpful in leading
to a decision than the conclusions reached after a consideration of be-
liefs as to banking practice, economic beliefs and accepted legal propo-
sitions.
The writers are inclined to agree with the judge. They have pursued
the method of the introspective jurist and find no answer to the question
whether, upon records "like" those in the Matter of Vavoudis and the
Smith & Setron Printing Company case, a preferred claim or a dividend
would be granted.
[To be continued]
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